Private incentives to vertical disintegration among firms with heterogeneous objectives

Rossini, Gianpaolo (2003) Private incentives to vertical disintegration among firms with heterogeneous objectives. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/623.
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Abstract

A vertically integrated monopoly is compared to a decentralized market arrangement where production is segmented. A Labor Managed firm produces an input used by a profit maximizer manufacturerof a final good. Unlike what usually occurs between homogenoeus firms we find circumstances in which the decentralised vertical arrangement is privately superior to the integrated one.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Rossini, Gianpaolo
Keywords
Vertical Integration Labor Managed Firms
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
17 Jun 2004
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 13:58
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