Quality Choice, Fixed Costs and Equilibrium in Models of Vertical Differentiation

Alvisi, Matteo (2000) Quality Choice, Fixed Costs and Equilibrium in Models of Vertical Differentiation. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/650.
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I provide a full characterization of the quality choice in duopolies with vertical differentiation, without assuming ex-ante if the market is fully covered or not. This will allow to show that covered or uncovered market configurations are endogenous outcomes of firms’ strategic interaction. To this purpose, I assume that firms are characterized by quadratic fixed costs of quality improvements and check whether pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria with a corner solution always exist. Finally, my results are compared to the quality choice that maximizes the total surplus of the economy. I show that the welfare-maximizing choice of qualities does not have to be found in the same market configuration of the corresponding market equilibrium.

Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Alvisi, Matteo
Parole chiave
quality oligopoly vertical differentiation market configuration subgame perfect equilibrium welfare analysis
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Data di deposito
17 Giu 2004
Ultima modifica
31 Ott 2012 09:38

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