Profit Taxation and Capital Accumulation in Dynamic Oligopoly Models

Baldini, Massimo ; Lambertini, Luca (2002) Profit Taxation and Capital Accumulation in Dynamic Oligopoly Models. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/652.
Full text available as:
[img]
Preview
PDF
Download (182kB) | Preview

Abstract

We illustrate two differential oligopoly games using, respectively, the capital accumulation dynamics ` a la Solow-Nerlove-Arrow, and the capital accumulation dynamics ` a la Ramsey. In both settings, we evaluate the effects of (gross) profit taxation, proving that there exist tax rates yielding the same steady state social welfare as under social planning. Contrary to the static approach, our dynamic analysis shows that, in general, profit taxation affects firms’ decisions concerning capital accumulation and sales. In particular, it has procompetitive effects provided that the extent of delegation is large enough.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Baldini, Massimo
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
differential games capital accumulation open-loop equilibria closed-loop equilibria profit taxation
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
17 Jun 2004
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 13:59
URI

Other metadata

Downloads

Downloads

Staff only: View the document

^