Guards vs Vigilantes: The Effect of Rule Enforcement Strategies on Sustainable Use Norms in Common Property Regimes

Breen, Trevor ; Tavoni, Alessandro (2020) Guards vs Vigilantes: The Effect of Rule Enforcement Strategies on Sustainable Use Norms in Common Property Regimes. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche, p. 20. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/6564. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (1157). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

This paper uses replicator dynamics to compare the steady states arising from two types of common property regimes - one in which over-exploiters are punished by the resource users themselves, and another where enforcement is handled by guards who collect a tax from the users. The use of guards requires a less restrictive set of parametric conditions in order to maintain an equilibrium with no over-exploiters. However, it can also stabilize an outcome in which all users over-exploit and are punished, but not enough to induce more cooperation (less resource extraction). These results can be used in guiding and structuring the formation of new common property regimes.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Breen, TrevorUniversity of Alberta0000-0002-0807-689X
Tavoni, AlessandroUniversity of Bologna0000-0002-2057-5720
Keywords
Common Property, Evolutionary Game Theory, Institutions, Punishment
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
09 Dec 2020 13:23
Last modified
09 Dec 2020 13:23
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