Advertising in a Differential Oligopoly Game

Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca (2001) Advertising in a Differential Oligopoly Game. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/658.
Full text disponibile come:
Documento PDF
Download (83kB) | Anteprima
Documento PDF
Download (25kB) | Anteprima


We illustrate a differential oligopoly game where firms compete à la Cournot in homogeneous goods in the market phase, and invest in advertising activities aimed at increasing consumers’ reservation price. Such investments produce external effects, characterizing the advertising activity as a public good. We derive the open-loop and the closed-loop Nash equilibria, and show that the properties of the equilibria depend on the curvature of the market demand function. The comparative assessment of these equilibria shows that firms’ advertising efforts are larger in the open-loop than in the closed-loop equilibrium. We also show that a cartel involving all firms, setting both quantities and advertising efforts so as to maximize joint profits, may produce a steady state where social welfare is higher than the social welfare levels associated with both the non-cooperative settings.

Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
advertising differential games capital accumulation open-loop equilibria closed-loop equilibria
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Data di deposito
17 Giu 2004
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 14:00

Altri metadati

Statistica sui download

Statistica sui download

Gestione del documento: Visualizza il documento