Vertical Product Differentiation, Network Competition and Regulation of Connectivity

Lanzi, Diego (2001) Vertical Product Differentiation, Network Competition and Regulation of Connectivity. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/673.
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Abstract

In this paper competition between two network firms is analysed under two alternative regulatory regimes: a global connectivity regulation (GCR) and an efficient component pricing regulation (ECPRe). Whereas a GCR imposes a full quality of reciprocal interconnection, firms will choose vertical product differentiation in order to lower price competition, while under a ECPRe they will choose the maximum level of services quality and a global degradation of connectivity. Hence firms’ decisions about whether or not vertically differentiate products seems to be, at least partially, related to regulatory rules imposed on the market.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lanzi, Diego
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DOI
Deposit date
17 Jun 2004
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 14:00
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