Dynamic Duopoly with Vertical Differentiation

Lambertini, Luca (2001) Dynamic Duopoly with Vertical Differentiation. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/679.
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Abstract

I analyse a differential game where firms, through capital accumulation over time, supply vertically differentiated goods. This proves that several results obtained by the static approach are not robust. I show that (i) the sustainability of the duopoly regime is conditional upon the level of firms’ R&D investments; (ii) there are quality ranges where the low quality firm invests more than the high quality firm; (ii) there are quality ranges where the low quality firm’s profits are larger than the high quality firm’s.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
differential game capital accumulation R&D product quality
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
17 Jun 2004
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 14:00
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