Dynamic Oligopoly with Sticky Prices: Closed-Loop, Feedback and Open-Loop Solutions

Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca (2000) Dynamic Oligopoly with Sticky Prices: Closed-Loop, Feedback and Open-Loop Solutions. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/681.
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Abstract

We investigate a dynamic oligopoly game with price adjustments. We show that the subgame perfect equilibria are characterised by larger output and lower price levels then the open-loop solution. The individual (and industry) output at the closed-loop equilibrium is larger than its counterpart at the feedback equilibrium. Therefore, firms prefer the open-loop equilibrium to the feedback equilibrium, and the latter to the closed-loop equilibrium. The opposite applies to consumers.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
differential games loop decision rules subgame perfection
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
17 Jun 2004
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 14:00
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