The Monopolist’s Optimal R&D Portfolio

Lambertini, Luca (2000) The Monopolist’s Optimal R&D Portfolio. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/683.
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The monopolist’s incentives towards product and process innovations are evaluated against the social optimum. The main findings are that (i) the incentive to invest in cost-reducing R&D is inversely related to the number of varieties being supplied at equilibrium, under both regimes; (ii) distortions obtain under monopoly, w.r.t. both the number of varieties and the technology. With substitutes (respectively, complements), the monopolist’s product range is smaller (respectively, larger) than under social planning. For any given number of goods, the monopolist operates at a higher marginal cost than the planner does.

Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
multiproduct firm process innovation product innovation
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Data di deposito
17 Giu 2004
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 14:00

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