Joint Venture for Product Innovation and Cartel Stability under Vertical Differentiation

Iori, Cristina ; Lambertini, Luca (2000) Joint Venture for Product Innovation and Cartel Stability under Vertical Differentiation. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/689.
Full text disponibile come:
[img]
Anteprima
Documento PDF
Download (252kB) | Anteprima

Abstract

We describe a vertically differentiated market where firms choose between activating either independent ventures leading to distinct product qualities, or a joint venture for a single quality. Then, firms either repeat the oneshot Nash equilibrium forever, or behave collusively, according to discount factors. We prove that there exists a parameter region where the joint venture makes it more difficult for firms to sustain collusive behaviour, as compared to independent ventures. Therefore, public policies towards R&D behaviour should be designed so as not to become inconsistent with the procompetitive attitude characterising the current legislation on marketing practices.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Iori, Cristina
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
product quality R&D investment implicit collusion joint venture independent ventures
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
DOI
Data di deposito
17 Giu 2004
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 14:01
URI

Altri metadati

Statistica sui download

Statistica sui download

Gestione del documento: Visualizza il documento

^