Delegation vs Cost-Reducing R&D in a Cournot Duopoly

Lambertini, Luca ; Primavera, Gabriele (2000) Delegation vs Cost-Reducing R&D in a Cournot Duopoly. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/697.
Full text disponibile come:
Documento PDF
Download (162kB) | Anteprima


We describe a duopoly model where stockholders assess the relative profitability of delegation versus process innovation. Delegation may not be a dominant strategy. When it is, the game is not necessarily a prisoners’ dilemma. Our model yields several equilibria where at least one firm remains entrepreneurial and finds it preferable to undertake cost-reducing R&D activities. Then, we introduce the possibility of using delegation and cost-reducing R&D jointly. The use of R&D investment by entrepreneurial firms is a dominated strategy, so that firms always separate ownership from control, while they don’t necessarily combine delegation with process innovation.

Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Lambertini, Luca
Primavera, Gabriele
Parole chiave
Cournot behaviour delegation cost-reducing R&D
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Data di deposito
17 Giu 2004
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 14:01

Altri metadati

Statistica sui download

Statistica sui download

Gestione del documento: Visualizza il documento