Bernardini Papalia, Rosa
(1998)

*An Optimal Partnership Search Model: Theoretical Implications for the Europartenariat Event.*
DOI

10.6092/unibo/amsacta/738.

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## Abstract

A theoretical search model applied to collaboration among firms with a public authority as an intermediate is the primary issue of this paper. Specifically, we consider the Europartenariat event since it represents a good opportunity to study a problem of interaction between the decision to search a collaboration and the exchange of information involved in a bargaining process. Search costs play a central role in this framework. We show the optimality of a strategy as to the number of contacts with host companies in a problem of dynamic programming. Precisely, solutions in a search model with the presence of fixed and quadratic costs are derived in terms of an optimal threshold number of contacts and of an optimal interval of the number of contacts, respectively. For the case of fixed costs, we find that the minimum number of contacts for which the firm accepts to participate is negatively related to the expected profit and to the probability of contacting one firm with a common project of collaboration. This is confirmed by a simulation. In the quadratic cost hypothesis we investigate learning phenomena and revelation of private information.

Abstract

A theoretical search model applied to collaboration among firms with a public authority as an intermediate is the primary issue of this paper. Specifically, we consider the Europartenariat event since it represents a good opportunity to study a problem of interaction between the decision to search a collaboration and the exchange of information involved in a bargaining process. Search costs play a central role in this framework. We show the optimality of a strategy as to the number of contacts with host companies in a problem of dynamic programming. Precisely, solutions in a search model with the presence of fixed and quadratic costs are derived in terms of an optimal threshold number of contacts and of an optimal interval of the number of contacts, respectively. For the case of fixed costs, we find that the minimum number of contacts for which the firm accepts to participate is negatively related to the expected profit and to the probability of contacting one firm with a common project of collaboration. This is confirmed by a simulation. In the quadratic cost hypothesis we investigate learning phenomena and revelation of private information.

Tipologia del documento

Monografia
(Working paper)

Autori

Settori scientifico-disciplinari

DOI

Data di deposito

17 Giu 2004

Ultima modifica

17 Feb 2016 14:02

URI

## Altri metadati

Tipologia del documento

Monografia
(Working paper)

Autori

Settori scientifico-disciplinari

DOI

Data di deposito

17 Giu 2004

Ultima modifica

17 Feb 2016 14:02

URI

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