Time Consistency in Games of Timing

Lambertini, Luca (1998) Time Consistency in Games of Timing. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/744.
Full text available as:
[img]
Preview
PDF
Download (308kB) | Preview

Abstract

This paper tackles the issue of choosing roles in duopoly games. First, it is shown that the two necessary (and su¢cient, if both satisfied) conditions for sequential play to emerge at equilibrium are that both leader and follower are at least weakly better off than under simultaneous play. Second, by means of a two-stage game of vertical differentiation, it is shown that if firms can commit to their respective timing decisions, there may exists a case where the leader is not necessarily better off than in the simultaneous equilibrium. Finally, in the absence of any commitment devices, it is proved that the timing choice can be time inconsistent if it is taken before firms proceed to play in both stages taking place in real time.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
extended game sequential play simultaneous play time consistency vertical differentiation
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
17 Jun 2004
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 14:03
URI

Other metadata

Downloads

Downloads

Staff only: View the document

^