Extended Games Played by Managerial Firms

Lambertini, Luca (1998) Extended Games Played by Managerial Firms. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/749.
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Abstract

The issue of timing is addressed in a game between managerial firms. The choice over timing can be taken either by managers or by entrepreneurs. It is shown that (i) delegation drastically modifies the owners' preferences concerning the distribution of roles, as compared to the setting where firms act as pure profit-maximizers; and (ii) the ability of moving first in the market game entails that, at least observationally, the owner of the leading firm prefers not to delegate. I show that the choice of the timing by managers entails the same profit owners would achieve by specifying the timing in the delegation contract.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
delegation extended games timing, roles
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
17 Jun 2004
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 14:03
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