Endogenous Timing and the Choice of Quality in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly

Lambertini, Luca (1998) Endogenous Timing and the Choice of Quality in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/751.
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Abstract

The endogenous choice of timing is discussed in a vertically differentiated duopoly where quality improvement requires a fixed convex cost. The timing decision concerns the quality stage. Using an extended game with observable delay, it is shown that only simultaneous equilibria can arise. This puts into question the ability of Stackelberg games to describe the entry process.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
product quality R&D investment timing extended game
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
17 Jun 2004
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 14:03
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