Full vs Partial Market Coverage with Minimum Quality Standards

Ecchia, Giulio ; Lambertini, Luca (1997) Full vs Partial Market Coverage with Minimum Quality Standards. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/759.
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Abstract

The consequences of the adoption of quality standards on the extent of market coverage is investigated by modelling a game between regulator and low-quality firm in a vertically differentiated duopoly. The game has a unique equilibrium in the most part of the parameter range. There exists a non-negligible range where the game has no equilibrium in pure strategies. This result questions the feasibility of MQS regulation when firms endogenously determine market coverage.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Ecchia, Giulio
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
Minimum Quality Standard market coverage
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
17 Jun 2004
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 14:03
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