Prisoners’ Dilemma in Duopoly (Super)games

Lambertini, Luca (1998) Prisoners’ Dilemma in Duopoly (Super)games. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/773.
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Abstract

The choice between quantity and price in order to stabilize collusion is modeled here. It is shown that this relocates the prisoners’ dilemma backwards, from the market stage to the stage where the market variable is chosen in order to sustain collusion, and where discount rates appear as the payoffs. Likewise, a prisoners’ dilemma arises also when both the market variable and the type of behavior (cooperative or non-cooperative) are simultaneously chosen.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
meta-game supergame prisoners’ dilemma
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
17 Jun 2004
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 14:04
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