Prisoners’ Dilemma in Duopoly (Super)games

Lambertini, Luca (1998) Prisoners’ Dilemma in Duopoly (Super)games. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/773.
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Abstract

The choice between quantity and price in order to stabilize collusion is modeled here. It is shown that this relocates the prisoners’ dilemma backwards, from the market stage to the stage where the market variable is chosen in order to sustain collusion, and where discount rates appear as the payoffs. Likewise, a prisoners’ dilemma arises also when both the market variable and the type of behavior (cooperative or non-cooperative) are simultaneously chosen.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
meta-game supergame prisoners’ dilemma
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
DOI
Data di deposito
17 Giu 2004
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 14:04
URI

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