Vertical Differentiation, Trade and Endogenous Common Standards

Lambertini, Luca ; Rossini, Gianpaolo (1998) Vertical Differentiation, Trade and Endogenous Common Standards. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/774.
Full text available as:
[img]
Preview
PDF
Download (304kB) | Preview

Abstract

Different market settings are considered in a free trade environment, where firms can choose technology, quality, and price or quantity. The shape of competition in prices requires the intervention of governments, via a common antidumping policy, to make firms converge on the simultaneous equilibrium which is socially optimal. In the Cournot framework, the equilibria we obtain impinge upon the kind of precommitments undertaken by firms. The coincidence between firms' behaviour and social preference obtains either when competition is tough, since income is low, or when firms must compete in quantities in the market stage, since they cannot modify qualities. The spontaneous coordination over common standards has to be contrasted with both the case of a²uent consumers and Bertrand competition.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Rossini, Gianpaolo
Keywords
quality technology standard coordination
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
17 Jun 2004
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 14:04
URI

Other metadata

Downloads

Downloads

Staff only: View the document

^