Vertical Differentiation, Trade and Endogenous Common Standards

Lambertini, Luca ; Rossini, Gianpaolo (1998) Vertical Differentiation, Trade and Endogenous Common Standards. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/774.
Full text disponibile come:
[thumbnail of 263.pdf]
Anteprima
Documento PDF
Download (304kB) | Anteprima

Abstract

Different market settings are considered in a free trade environment, where firms can choose technology, quality, and price or quantity. The shape of competition in prices requires the intervention of governments, via a common antidumping policy, to make firms converge on the simultaneous equilibrium which is socially optimal. In the Cournot framework, the equilibria we obtain impinge upon the kind of precommitments undertaken by firms. The coincidence between firms' behaviour and social preference obtains either when competition is tough, since income is low, or when firms must compete in quantities in the market stage, since they cannot modify qualities. The spontaneous coordination over common standards has to be contrasted with both the case of a²uent consumers and Bertrand competition.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Rossini, Gianpaolo
Parole chiave
quality technology standard coordination
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
DOI
Data di deposito
17 Giu 2004
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 14:04
URI

Altri metadati

Statistica sui download

Statistica sui download

Gestione del documento: Visualizza il documento

^