The International Coordination of Monetary Policy: A Game-Theoretic Reformulation

Lambertini, Luca (1998) The International Coordination of Monetary Policy: A Game-Theoretic Reformulation. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/780.
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Abstract

This paper reformulates the issue of the international coordination of monetary policy in the framework of an extended game with observable delay, where govern-ments are required to set the timing of their respective actions before proceeding to the actual choice of their monetary policies. This allows to shrink significantly the set of equilibria.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
monetary policy extended game sequential play simultaneous play
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
17 Jun 2004
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 14:04
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