Exogenous product differentiation and the stability of collusion

Lambertini, Luca (1995) Exogenous product differentiation and the stability of collusion. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/798.
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The stability of collusion in quantities in a differentiated duopoly is analised, and the result is compared to that emerging in the case of price-setting behaviour. It turns out that quantity collusion is generally better sustained than price collusion, unless products are almost perfect substitutes. Under both quantity and price competition, the social damage associated with collusion is increasing in the degree of substitutability.

Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
cartel stability product differentiation
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Data di deposito
17 Giu 2004
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 14:05

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