Cournot vs Stackelberg equilibria with entrepreneurial and labour managed firms

Lambertini, Luca (1995) Cournot vs Stackelberg equilibria with entrepreneurial and labour managed firms. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/800.
Full text disponibile come:
[img]
Anteprima
Documento PDF
Download (39kB) | Anteprima

Abstract

The issue of equilibrium selection in a duopoly game between a profit maximizing and a labour managed firm is addressed under either price or quantity competition with product differentiation. If firms can choose the timing of moves before competing in the relevant market variable, the Bertrand game yields multiple equilibria, while the Cournot game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with the profit maximizing firm in the leader’s role and the labour managed firm in the follower’s role. Due to a lower total output, the Cournot-Stackelberg equilibrium yields a lower level of social welfare as compared to the simultaneous equilibrium. This reduces the incentive to transform an LM duopoly into a mixed one.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
extended game sequential play
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
DOI
Data di deposito
17 Giu 2004
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 14:05
URI

Altri metadati

Statistica sui download

Statistica sui download

Gestione del documento: Visualizza il documento

^