Aggregate uncertainty, political instability and redistribution

Bellettini, Giorgio (1995) Aggregate uncertainty, political instability and redistribution. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/804.
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Abstract

This paper associates political instability to real shocks affecting the income of the median voter, in a two-period model where two political parties set redistribution in order to defend the interests of well-defined constituencies. Implemented policies affect future voting outcomes and an intertemporal trade-off arises for the parties since their optimal one-period strategy does not maximize the probability of being reelected. The higher the volatility of the real shock, the more likely that parties deviate from the optimal one-period strategy by choosing a conservative strategy, which increases their chances of reelection and the expected lifetime utility of their constituencies.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Bellettini, Giorgio
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DOI
Deposit date
17 Jun 2004
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 14:05
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