Lambertini, Luca
 
(1994)
Cartel stability and the curvature of market demand.
    
    
    
     
     DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/806.
    
    
     
  
  
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      URL ufficiale: http://www.dse.unibo.it/wp/211.pdf
    
  
  
    Abstract
The stability of collusion is analysed for a family of demand functions whose curvature is determined by a parameter varying between zero and infinity. If demand is sufficiently convex, firms may prefer to act as quantity setters in order to increase cartel stability. Otherwise, price-setting behaviour enhances their ability to collude.
Abstract
      
    

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