Board of director collusion, managerial incentives and firm values

Andergassen, Rainer (2011) Board of director collusion, managerial incentives and firm values. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 27. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4443. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (795). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of board of director collusion on managerial incentives and firm values. Recent academic research hints at the social network of board of directors as an important conduit for coordinating corporate governance policies, such as managerial pay, and curbing competition. We study a model where managers can exert unobservable cost-cutting effort and investigate the consequences of and the incentives for coordinating managerial pay among corporate boards.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Andergassen, Rainer
Parole chiave
Board of director collusion, managerial incentives, pay-for-performance sensitivity, firm values, managerial pay
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
25 Gen 2016 15:47
Ultima modifica
25 Gen 2016 15:47
URI

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