High powered Incentives and Fraudulent Behavior: Stock based versus Stock Option based Compensation

Andergassen, Rainer (2005) High powered Incentives and Fraudulent Behavior: Stock based versus Stock Option based Compensation. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 13. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4748. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (542). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text disponibile come:
[thumbnail of 542.pdf]
Anteprima
Documento di testo(pdf)
Licenza: Creative Commons Attribution 2.5 (CC BY 2.5)

Download (189kB) | Anteprima

Abstract

In this paper shareholders face the trade-off between providing managers with incentives to exert beneficial effort and to engage in costly fraudulent activity. We solve for the optimal compensation package, given that shareholders can either grant (restricted) stock or stock options and given fixed average compensation costs. We show that if the negative effect of fraud on the company’s value is sufficiently large then stock based compensation is optimal. Otherwise, stock option based compensation is optimal. Furthermore, we show that the fraud to effort ratio is increasing in the strike price and that the optimal strike price is decreasing in the size of the negative effects of fraud on the company’s value.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Andergassen, Rainer
Parole chiave
executive compensation, stock options, restricted stock, fraud, incentives
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
01 Apr 2016 09:27
Ultima modifica
01 Apr 2016 09:27
URI

Altri metadati

Statistica sui download

Statistica sui download

Gestione del documento: Visualizza il documento

^