Lambertini, Luca ; Tedeschi, Piero
(2003)
Would you like to enter first with a low-quality good?
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 8.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4800.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(494).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
Using a two-period duopoly model with vertical differentiation, we show that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where the first entrant supplies a lower quality and gains higher profits than the second entrant. We also prove that this entry sequence is also socially efficient.
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