Piracy and Quality Choice in Monopolistic Markets.

Alvisi, Matteo ; Argentesi, Elena ; Carbonara, Emanuela (2002) Piracy and Quality Choice in Monopolistic Markets. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 21. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4862. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (436). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We study the impact of piracy on the quality choices of a monopolist. In the absence of piracy, the monopolist has no incentive to differentiate its products. With piracy the monopolist might instead produce more than one quality, so that differentiation arises as the optimal strategy. This is because the producer wants to divert consumers from the pirated good to the original one. Differentiation involves either producing a new, low-quality good such that piracy is either eliminated or still observed in equilibrium.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Alvisi, Matteo
Argentesi, Elena
Carbonara, Emanuela
Parole chiave
Product differentiation, Multiproduct monopolist, Quality, Piracy.
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
15 Mar 2016 09:50
Ultima modifica
15 Mar 2016 09:50
URI

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