Vertical Product Differentiation, Network Competition and Regulation of Connectivity

Lanzi, Diego (2001) Vertical Product Differentiation, Network Competition and Regulation of Connectivity. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 22. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4896. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (405). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

In this paper competition between two network firms is analysed under two alternative regulatory regimes: a global connectivity regulation (GCR) and an efficient component pricing regulation (ECPRe). Whereas a GCR imposes a full quality of reciprocal interconnection, firms will choose vertical product differentiation in order to lower price competition, while under a ECPRe they will choose the maximum level of services quality and a global degradation of connectivity. Hence firms’ decisions about whether or not vertically differentiate products seems to be, at least partially, related to regulatory rules imposed on the market.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lanzi, Diego
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
17 Mar 2016 11:20
Ultima modifica
09 Giu 2016 09:42
URI

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