Dynamic Hotelling Monopoly with Product Development

Lambertini, Luca (2001) Dynamic Hotelling Monopoly with Product Development. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 29. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4902. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (399). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text disponibile come:
[thumbnail of 399.pdf]
Anteprima
Documento di testo(pdf)
Licenza: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial 3.0 (CC BY-NC 3.0)

Download (230kB) | Anteprima

Abstract

I characterise R&D investment in product innovation of a profit-seeking monopolist versus that of a social planner in a spatial market, under either partial or full market coverage. Under partial coverage, the steady state product design is the outcome of the tradeoff between the incentive to locate as close as possible to the middle of the preference space, and the incentive to save upon R&D costs. The planner does not produce the variety preferred by the average consumer, in situations where the R&D investment is too costly. This result is reinforced under full market coverage, where the planner’s incentive to innovate is always weaker than the monopolist’s, and the planner produces the average (and median) consumer’s preferred variety if and only if the rental price of capital is nil.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
horizontal differentiation, R&D, steady state, saddle point
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
18 Mar 2016 10:13
Ultima modifica
18 Mar 2016 10:13
URI

Altri metadati

Statistica sui download

Statistica sui download

Gestione del documento: Visualizza il documento

^