Standardization and the Stability of Collusion

Lambertini, Luca ; Poddar, Sougata ; Sasaki, Dan (1997) Standardization and the Stability of Collusion. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 9. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5012. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (298). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We characterize the interplay between firms' decision in terms of product standardization and the nature of their ensuing market behaviour. We prove the existence of a non-monotone relationship between firms' decision at the product stage and their intertemporal preferences.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Poddar, Sougata
Sasaki, Dan
Parole chiave
RJVs, product innovation, critical discount factor.
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche > SECS-P/01 Economia politica
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5012
Data di deposito
05 Apr 2016 09:02
Ultima modifica
05 Apr 2016 09:02
URI
https://amsacta.unibo.it/id/eprint/5012

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