Price vs Quantity in a Repeated Differentiated Duopoly

Lambertini, Luca ; Schultz, Christian (2000) Price vs Quantity in a Repeated Differentiated Duopoly. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/695.
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Abstract

We investigate the choice of market variable, price or quantity, of an opti-mal implicit cartel. If the discount factor is high, the cartel can realize the monopoly profit in both cases. Otherwise, it is optimal for the cartel to rely on quantities in the collusive phase if goods are substitutes and prices if goods are complements. The reason is that this minimizes the gains from deviations from collusive play.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Schultz, Christian
Parole chiave
partial collusion product differentiation
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
DOI
Data di deposito
17 Giu 2004
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 14:01
URI

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