Corner Solutions in a Model of Military Alliances

Cati, Matteo Maria (2008) Corner Solutions in a Model of Military Alliances. Rimini: Diapason, p. 9. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/2595. In: Note e ricerche
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In this paper I study corner solutions in a Model of Military Alliances. In particular I analyze how corner solutions affect the level of defence expenditure. I find that accounting for corner solutions, the so called ‘Exploitation Hypothesis’ may no longer be reversed and can indeed be reinforced as one moves from the Cournot to the Stackelberg equilibrium. JEL Classification: A1 – General Economics

Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Cati, Matteo Maria
military alliances, defence, public goods, free-riding, corner solutions
Deposit date
27 Jul 2009
Last modified
16 May 2011 12:10

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