To know or not to know: Endogenous market structure when information can be strategically neglected

Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca ; Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P. (2015) To know or not to know: Endogenous market structure when information can be strategically neglected. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 35. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4156. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (987). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We study the firms’ choice of whether or not to consider pieces of information concerning their interdependence. In particular, any firm can strategically choose to consider or not the fact that industry output is affected by its own production choice. If this piece of information is considered, the firm behaves as an aligopolist; if not, firm behaves in a monopolistically competitive way. Thus, the market regime is endogenously determined. We show that different outcomes can emerge, depending on the number of firms, the degree of product substitutability and the cost structure.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P.
Keywords
information, strategic interaction, monopolistic competition, oligopoly, delegation
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
14 Jan 2015 15:03
Last modified
03 Mar 2015 10:21
URI

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