Mantovani, Andrea ;
Loginova, Oksana
(2015)
Information and Online Reviews.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 29.
DOI
10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4177.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(996).
ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
Abstract
Online review aggregators, such as TripAdvisor, HotelClub and OpenTable help consumers
identify the products and services that best match their preferences. The goal of this
study is to understand the impact of online review aggregators on firms and consumers. We
adopt Salop’s circular city model in which consumers initially do not know the locations of
the firms in the product space. The firms decide whether or not to be listed on an online review
aggregator’s website and choose their prices. When a firm resorts to the aggregator, its
location and price become observable to the consumers who visit the website. We consider
two different scenarios, depending on the possibility for online firms to offer discounts to
the consumers who book online. We show that in equilibrium not all firms will go online
– some will remain offline. Online firms attract more customers than their offline counterparts
due to reduced mismatch costs, but face a tougher price competition. Comparing the
equilibrium prices, profits and the number of firms that go online across the scenarios, we
derive interesting conclusions from the private and the social standpoints.
Abstract
Online review aggregators, such as TripAdvisor, HotelClub and OpenTable help consumers
identify the products and services that best match their preferences. The goal of this
study is to understand the impact of online review aggregators on firms and consumers. We
adopt Salop’s circular city model in which consumers initially do not know the locations of
the firms in the product space. The firms decide whether or not to be listed on an online review
aggregator’s website and choose their prices. When a firm resorts to the aggregator, its
location and price become observable to the consumers who visit the website. We consider
two different scenarios, depending on the possibility for online firms to offer discounts to
the consumers who book online. We show that in equilibrium not all firms will go online
– some will remain offline. Online firms attract more customers than their offline counterparts
due to reduced mismatch costs, but face a tougher price competition. Comparing the
equilibrium prices, profits and the number of firms that go online across the scenarios, we
derive interesting conclusions from the private and the social standpoints.
Document type
Monograph
(Working Paper)
Creators
Keywords
online review aggregators, price discrimination, competition
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
12 Mar 2015 13:19
Last modified
28 Oct 2015 14:23
URI
Other metadata
Document type
Monograph
(Working Paper)
Creators
Keywords
online review aggregators, price discrimination, competition
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
12 Mar 2015 13:19
Last modified
28 Oct 2015 14:23
URI
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