Arruñada, Benito ; Casari, Marco ; Pancotto, Francesca
(2012)
Are Self-regarding Subjects More Strategic?
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 13.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4213.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(805).
ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
Preview |
PDF
License: Creative Commons: Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 (CC BY-NC 3.0) Download (422kB) | Preview |
Abstract
To investigate the relationship between the depth of strategic thinking and social preferences we ask subjects in an experiment to perform dictator games and a guessing game. The guessing game measures depth of strategic thinking while dictator games control for social preferences. When performing a comparison within the same degree of strategic reasoning, self-regarding subjects show more strategic sophistication than other subjects.
Abstract
Other metadata
Downloads
Downloads
Staff only:
