Parabolic Cylinders and Folk Theorems

Delbono, Flavio ; Lambertini, Luca (2015) Parabolic Cylinders and Folk Theorems. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 21. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4415. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (1043). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We study a class of games featuring payoff functions being parabolic cylinders where best reply functions are orthogonal and therefore the pure-strategy non-cooperative solution is attained as a Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies. We prove that the resulting threshold of the discount factor above which implicit collusion on the Pareto frontier is stable in the infinite supergames is independent of the number of players. This holds irrespective of whether punishment is based on infinite Nash reversion or one-shot stick-and-carrot strategy. We outline two examples stemming from economic theory and one from international relations.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Delbono, Flavio
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
parabolic cylinder, supergame, folk theorem, implicit collusion
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
14 Dic 2015 09:45
Ultima modifica
07 Giu 2017 08:17
URI

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