Lambertini, Luca ; Tampieri, Alessandro
(2011)
Low-Quality Leadership in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Cournot Competition.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 11.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4490.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(750).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
We model a vertically differentiated duopoly with quantity-setting firms as an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage, to show that at the subgame perfect equilibrium sequential play obtains, with the low-quality firm taking the leaders role.
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