R&D-hindering collusion

Bacchiega, Emanuele ; Lambertini, Luca ; Mantovani, Andrea (2008) R&D-hindering collusion. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 18. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4595. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (651). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

In an extended version of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) R&D competition model we find a region where the game is a prisoner's dilemma: firms still invest in R&D but they would obtain a higher profit by not investing at all. In a repeated version of the game, we prove that firms implicitly tend to collude and refrain from investing in R&D, thus decreasing social welfare. When this happens, inviting firms to form a joint venture appears as a remedy to the lack of innovation efforts rather than the excess thereof.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Bacchiega, Emanuele
Lambertini, Luca
Mantovani, Andrea
Parole chiave
collusion, process innovation, social welfare
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
15 Feb 2016 14:10
Ultima modifica
15 Feb 2016 14:10
URI

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