Bacchiega, Emanuele ; Lambertini, Luca ; Mantovani, Andrea
(2008)
R&D-hindering collusion.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 18.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4595.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(651).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
In an extended version of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) R&D competition model we find a region where the game is a prisoner's dilemma: firms still invest in R&D but they would obtain a higher profit by not investing at all. In a repeated version of the game, we prove that firms implicitly tend to collude and refrain from investing in R&D, thus decreasing social welfare. When this happens, inviting firms to form a joint venture appears as a remedy to the lack of innovation efforts rather than the excess thereof.
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