Antitrust Guidelines: A Simple Operational Method for Evaluating Horizontal Mergers

Dragone, Davide ; Lambertini, Luca ; Mantovani, Andrea (2007) Antitrust Guidelines: A Simple Operational Method for Evaluating Horizontal Mergers. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 18. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4692. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (591). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We reexamine the profitability and social efficiency of horizontal mergers in a Cournot oligopoly with decreasing average costs. Assuming the merger allows for efficiency gains in production, we identify the conditions under which the merger is, respectively, profitable and socially desirable. The economic preditions of the model are contrasted with FTC guidelines, based on a simple method that allows to forecast the economic consequances of a merger in terms of ex ante observables. This comparative assessment highlights the existence of well defined parameter regions where FTC guidelines lead to systematic errors.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Dragone, Davide
Lambertini, Luca
Mantovani, Andrea
Keywords
horizontal merger, oligopoly, efficiency
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
26 Feb 2016 11:17
Last modified
26 Feb 2016 11:17
URI

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