Bono, Giovanni
(2005)
Monitoring Team Production by Design.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 14.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4750.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(540).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
This work addresses the optimal design of the monitoring technology for a team when collective liability can not form. It shows that the principal’s optimal design choice is then to concentrate monitoring on the less productive agent in a team. By controlling the less productive agent she fully discipline the more productive. This result helps in studying the interplay between the institutional set-up and the technological capabilities of teams
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