Barigozzi, Francesca
(2004)
Supplementary Insurance with Ex-Post Moral Hazard: Efficiency and Redistribution.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 26.
DOI
10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4769.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(521).
ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
Abstract
This paper investigates the topping-up scheme in health insurance
when both public and private firms use linear contracts. First, the case
with identical consumers is analyzed. The optimal public coverage is
derived both when the firms play simultaneously and when they play sequentially.
In the former case consumers are over-insured, whereas, in the
latter case, the second-best allocation is obtained. Then, consumers’ heterogeneity
is introduced: consumers differ in their wage rate and labour
supply is endogenous. It is assumed that public coverage is uniform and
health expenditures are financed by linear taxation. Results show that,
in the sequential game, the optimal public coverage is negative and consumers
are under-insured.
Abstract
This paper investigates the topping-up scheme in health insurance
when both public and private firms use linear contracts. First, the case
with identical consumers is analyzed. The optimal public coverage is
derived both when the firms play simultaneously and when they play sequentially.
In the former case consumers are over-insured, whereas, in the
latter case, the second-best allocation is obtained. Then, consumers’ heterogeneity
is introduced: consumers differ in their wage rate and labour
supply is endogenous. It is assumed that public coverage is uniform and
health expenditures are financed by linear taxation. Results show that,
in the sequential game, the optimal public coverage is negative and consumers
are under-insured.
Document type
Monograph
(Working Paper)
Creators
Keywords
private and public health insurance, ex-post moral hazard,
topping-up, redistribution.
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
10 Mar 2016 10:39
Last modified
10 Mar 2016 10:39
URI
Other metadata
Document type
Monograph
(Working Paper)
Creators
Keywords
private and public health insurance, ex-post moral hazard,
topping-up, redistribution.
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
10 Mar 2016 10:39
Last modified
10 Mar 2016 10:39
URI
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