Complementarity, Coordination and Credit

Fedele, Alessandro ; Mantovani, Andrea (2004) Complementarity, Coordination and Credit. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 19. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4792. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (502). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
[thumbnail of 502.pdf]
Preview
Text(pdf)
License: Creative Commons Attribution

Download (262kB) | Preview

Abstract

We consider a start-up firm which applies for a bank loan to implement a project based on complementary activities. The firm has the possibility to improve the complementarity effect by coordinating the activities. Coordination is costly and can be made either by using internal human resources or by hiring a consulting firm. In the former case the choice of coordination is not verifiable by the bank and a moral hazard problem arises, while in the latter information is symmetric. The role of consulting services is thus to mitigate the informational problem. Without consulting, the firm does not coordinate and either obtains no funding or the surplus of the project is not maximized.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Fedele, Alessandro
Mantovani, Andrea
Keywords
complementarity, inside and outside coordination, moral hazard
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
09 Mar 2016 15:20
Last modified
09 Mar 2016 15:20
URI

Other metadata

Downloads

Downloads

Staff only: View the document

^