Complementarity, Coordination and Credit

Fedele, Alessandro ; Mantovani, Andrea (2004) Complementarity, Coordination and Credit. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 19. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4792. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (502). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We consider a start-up firm which applies for a bank loan to implement a project based on complementary activities. The firm has the possibility to improve the complementarity effect by coordinating the activities. Coordination is costly and can be made either by using internal human resources or by hiring a consulting firm. In the former case the choice of coordination is not verifiable by the bank and a moral hazard problem arises, while in the latter information is symmetric. The role of consulting services is thus to mitigate the informational problem. Without consulting, the firm does not coordinate and either obtains no funding or the surplus of the project is not maximized.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Fedele, Alessandro
Mantovani, Andrea
Parole chiave
complementarity, inside and outside coordination, moral hazard
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
09 Mar 2016 15:20
Ultima modifica
09 Mar 2016 15:20
URI

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