Lambertini, Luca
(2004)
Innovation and Managerial Incentives: A Tale of Two Systems.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 10.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4796.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(498).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
This paper describes R&D competition between a managerial firm and an entrepreneurial one, in a Cournot market. It is shown that a manager interested in output expansion exerts higher R&D efforts, yielding productive efficiency as compared to the performance of a strictly profit-seeking firm. This may ultimately yield monopoly power for the managerial firm, if technological spillovers in the industry are low enough.
Abstract