Migration, Fiscal Competition and Brain Drain

Giannoccolo, Pierpaolo (2003) Migration, Fiscal Competition and Brain Drain. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 36. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4832. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (462). ISSN 2282-6483.
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In this paper I present a simple model in which I analyse the impact of labor mobility on redistributive policies and the provision of education as a publicly provided good. I’ve analysed different extensions of the model (Maximin objective function of the government and utilitarian function, symmetric and asymmetric population, one generation and two generation model) for check the results in different specifications of the world. The results obtained are in agreement to the literature: less redistribution and less provision of public good with respect to the efficient value (which could be obtained in the absence of mobility or in the presence of coordination among jurisdictions) The aim of this work is to underline this particular aspect of the fiscal competition: when we add up the two negative effects due to the absence of coordination among jurisdictions, the loss of efficiency is more accentuate. This result is important in the European contest because we have an increase of labor mobility. For this reason the possibility of brain drain added to fiscal competition and to an increase of the mobility can be more dangerous for the European jurisdictions and a coordination is necessary in the education policies and in the redistribution policies within the European Union.

Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Giannoccolo, Pierpaolo
Fiscal Competition inside Europe, migration of high educated workers, symmetric Nash Equilibria, potential Brain Drain, one generation model and OLG extension.
Deposit date
15 Mar 2016 09:14
Last modified
15 Mar 2016 09:14

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