Advertising and endogenous exit in a differentiated duopoly

Mantovani, Andrea ; Mion, Giordano (2002) Advertising and endogenous exit in a differentiated duopoly. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 26. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4840. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (455). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text disponibile come:
[thumbnail of 455.pdf]
Anteprima
Documento di testo(pdf)
Licenza: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial 3.0 (CC BY-NC 3.0)

Download (434kB) | Anteprima

Abstract

In this paper we consider a duopoly two-stage duopoly where firms first decide whether to invest in advertising and then compete in prices. Advertising has two effects: a market enlargement for both firms and a predatory gain for the investing firm only. Both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria may arise. The two most interesting cases are a coordination game where both firms investing and non-investing are equilibria, and a chicken game where only one firm invests while the other is possibly driven (endogenously) out of the market. Our results suggest that product differentiation has an ambiguous impact on investment in advertising and that strong product substitutability may induce a coordination problem.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Mantovani, Andrea
Mion, Giordano
Parole chiave
Advertising, product differentiation, endogenous exit, asymmetric equilibria, coordination games.
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
14 Mar 2016 16:02
Ultima modifica
14 Mar 2016 16:02
URI

Altri metadati

Statistica sui download

Statistica sui download

Gestione del documento: Visualizza il documento

^