Private and Social Incentives Towards Investment in Product Differentiation.

Lambertini, Luca ; Cellini, Roberto (2002) Private and Social Incentives Towards Investment in Product Differentiation. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 18. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4867. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (431). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We consider a nynamic oligopoly where firms invest to increase product differentiation and an externality effect operates in the R&D activity. We compare the steady state solutions under alternative decision rules, namely, the open-loop and the closed-loop Nash equilibrium. Significant differences emerge, concerning the effect of the number of firms upon the optimal degree o product differentiation. We also compare the privat optima with the social optimum, and derive implications concerning the social diserability of different decision rules.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Cellini, Roberto
Parole chiave
differential games, R&D investment, product differentiation, spillover
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
17 Mar 2016 12:55
Ultima modifica
17 Mar 2016 12:55
URI

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