Differential Oligopoly Games where the Closed-Loop Memoryless and Open-Loop Equilibria Coincide.

Lambertini, Luca ; Cellini, Roberto (2001) Differential Oligopoly Games where the Closed-Loop Memoryless and Open-Loop Equilibria Coincide. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 11. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4899. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (402). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We illustrate two di¤erential oligopoly games using, respectively, the capital accumulation dynamics à la Nerlove-Arrow, and the capital accumulation dynamics à la Ramsey. We prove that these games benefit from the property that closed-loop memoryless solutions degenerate into open-loop solutions, since the best reply of a generic firm is independent of the rivals’ state variables, which entails that the cross e¤ect from rivals’ states to own controls disappears.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Cellini, Roberto
Parole chiave
differential games, capital accumulation, open-loop equilibria, closed-loop equilibria
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche > SECS-P/01 Economia politica
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4899
Data di deposito
17 Mar 2016 11:56
Ultima modifica
17 Mar 2016 11:56
URI
https://amsacta.unibo.it/id/eprint/4899

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