Product Innovation Under Vertical Differentiation and the Persistence of Monopoly

Lambertini, Luca (1995) Product Innovation Under Vertical Differentiation and the Persistence of Monopoly. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 20. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5086. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (227). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

The incentives to innovate for the incumbent and the entrant in a vertically differentiated market are analised, in the absence of uncertainty. It turns out that if consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for quality is sufficiently low, the efficiency effect observationally works so as to favour innovation by the entrant, i.e., competition. Otherwise, it operates to the advantage of the incumbent who acquire the right to innovate, preempting thus the rival.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
Vertical product differentiation, Product innovation
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Data di deposito
05 Mag 2016 10:44
Ultima modifica
05 Mag 2016 10:44
URI

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