Lambertini, Luca
(1995)
Exogenous Product Differentiation and the Stability of Collusion.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 6.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5106.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(219).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
The stability of collusion in quantities in a differentiated duopoly is analised, and the result is compared to that emerging in the case of price-setting behaviour. It turns out that quantity collusion is generally better sustained than price collusion, unless products are almost perfect substitutes. Under both quantity and price competition, the social damage associated with collusion is increasing in the degree of substitutability.
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