Lambertini, Luca
(1994)
Delegation and Cartel Stability.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 15.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5118.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(208).
ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract
The effect of delegation on cartel stability is addressed in a duopoly for a homogeneous product, under Cournot competition. The main findings are that if only one firm is managerial, the critical discount factor is increased by the presence of a weight attached to sales, so that cartel stability is decreased, while if both are managerial the opposite holds. As a consequence, the inclusion of sales in both firms’ objective function represents an incentive towards collusion.
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